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Pride Stables ("Pride") hereby submits this Reply Brief'in further support of its
appeal.
REBUTTAL TO HOMESTEAD DEFENDANTS' FACTUAL ASSERTIONS
Throughout their Brief, Appellees Homestead Golf Club, Inc., Gerald R. Sanders and
Great Inns of the Rockies, Inc. (collectively referred to as "Homestead Defendants") misstate
a number of crucial facts. Pride will correct those errors as follows:
1.

Throughout their Brief Homestead Defendants state that they never admitted

to having promised to loan Pride $185,000. Homestead Defendants are mistaken because
in the Federal Action, the parties stipulated in the Pretrial Order to the following
uncontro verted fact: "Plaintiff [Homestead] and Defendant [Pride Stables] orally agreed
that Plaintiff would lend Defendant the sum of $185,000 so that Defendant could make
payment to certain of its secured creditors." (R. 1352).
2.

Throughout their Brief, Homestead Defendants state that they never contended

that the promised $ 185,000 loan only applied to the Clark-Pride Property and not to the 14th
Hole Property. Homestead Defendants are mistaken because during the course of the
Federal Action, Homestead Defendants took the position that this promise to loan Pride
$185,000 related only to the Clark-Pride Property. (Homestead Golf Club, Inc. v. Pride
Stables, 224 F.3d 1195, 1201 (10th Cir. 2000)).
3.

Throughout their Brief Homestead Defendants state that the 10th Circuit

determined that there was no agreement for them to make a $185,000 loan to Pride.
Homestead Defendants are mistaken because the 10th Circuit affirmed the District Court's
1

finding that there was no enforceable (i.e., express) contract between the parties, not that
there had never been a promise by Homestead Defendants to loan Pride $185,000, which is
an important distinction. (R. 1386; Homestead, 224 F.2d at 1195).
4.

Throughout their Brief, Homestead Defendants state that at the time they

received the June 15,1988 Letter of Commitment from Pride they did not know that Pride's
lenders would not subordinate. Homestead Defendants are mistaken because on June 8,
1988, Homestead Defendants' Vice President Stroud met with the co-owner of the ClarkPride Property, Cal Clark, and his attorney, Grant McFarlane, Jr., and during that meeting,
Stroud was told that Clark could not obtain subordination from lien holders on the ClarkPride Property. (R. 1337, 1412-13).1
5.

Throughout their Brief, Homestead Defendants state that they were prepared

to go forward with the promised loan but Pride refused to sign the loan documents,
including a "Master Lease Agreement" Homestead Defendants are mistaken because Pride
was unable to sign the loan documents since they contained the onerous subordination

1

That discussion occurred because Clark had received a $100,000 loan from
Homestead Defendants which he used to discharge a personal obligation to Valley Bank.
Stroud thus knew about the unwillingness of the other banks to subordinate any loans
which Homestead Defendants made to Clark or to Pride prior to Pride's execution of the
Letter of Commitment on June 15, 1988, and this included the all-important Davis
County Bank. (R. 1337, 1412-13). Homestead Defendants' misrepresentation of this
knowledge is evidence of their fraudulent intent. See McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust
Company, 779 F.2d 916, 921-22 (3rd Cir. 1985); Shapakv. Shertle, 629 A.2d 763, 772
(Md.App. 1993).
2

provision, which was not part of their original agreement between the parties, and Pride was
never asked to sign the Master Lease Agreement. (R. 1400, 1478).2
6.

Throughout their Brief, Homestead Defendants state that the 10th Circuit

clearly recognized its decision would have a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect upon
Pride's claims in the State Action. Homestead Defendants are mistaken because the 10th
Circuit clearly stated that its decision related only to the 14th Hole Property and "[did] not
preclude any pending or future actions involving claims relevant only to the ClarkPride Property:' {Homestead, 224 F. 3d at 1201 fn. 7).
7.

Throughout their Brief Homestead Defendants state that Pride's original

Complaint does not contain the factual allegations for non-contractual claims such as
promissory estoppel and/or detrimental reliance. Homestead Defendants are mistaken
because the following allegations taken from Pride's original Complaint encompass these
non-express contract theories of recovery.

2

The Federal Bankruptcy Court concluded that the loan agreement between
Homestead Defendants and Pride did not require Pride to obtain subordination of its
secured creditors to Homestead Defendants' loan and that the requirement of
subordination was not part of the loan agreement. (R. 1369 and 1373). The Federal
Bankruptcy Court also found that despite the fact that it was not required to do so under
the original agreement between the parties, Pride attempted in good faith to obtain
subordination from its creditors but was unsuccessful. Id. The Federal Bankruptcy Court
concluded, as a matter of law, that Homestead Defendants' refusal to make the promised
loan to Pride without the subordination of Pride's secured creditors was an anticipatory
repudiation of the loan agreement between them. (R. 1373). The Federal District Court
affirmed the Federal Bankruptcy Court on this issue (R. 1396). The Federal District
Court was in turn affirmed by the 10th Circuit. {Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1198).
3

On or about March 9, 1988, Plaintiff informed Defendants
(other than Valley) that, as a condition precedent to granting the
permission requested by said Defendants to build the said Golf
Course on portions of Plaintiffs property, Plaintiff needed
sufficient funds to obtain the forbearance of Valley and other
secured creditors from foreclosure during a period of two years
or more during the construction of the golf course and pending
the development and sale of Plaintiff s properties adjoining the
proposed golf course.
* * *

During May and June of 1988, in reliance upon the
representation of Defendants (other than Valley) that the
loan of $185,000 would be made promptly, Plaintiff orally
agreed with said Defendants to grant Homestead a license
to construct a large portion of its proposed golf course upon
portions of Plaintiff s properties in consideration of the said
loan.
* * *

Based upon the said oral agreements . . . and in partial
performance of said oral agreement, Plaintiffs' general
partner executed a letter addressed to Midway City, Utah
in the form prepared and requested by said Defendants . .
. to assist him in obtaining a permit from the City of
Midway for the construction of the said golf course, and
Defendants did in fact use that letter to obtain a building
permit and promptly thereafter began the construction of
the golf course.
* * *

[Defendants have failed and refused to perform the oral
agreement to make the said loan and to execute the
proposed written agreement and have failed and refused to
provide Plaintiff with any part of said loan save and except
for the sum of $5,000 which was advanced to Plaintiffs on
or about July 7,1988.
* * *

4

Notwithstanding the aforesaid . . . breach of the oral agreement
by said Defendants . . . Defendants proceeded to occupy
portions of Plaintiffs' lands and have entered into a series
of contracts with third persons for construction work and
materials and have induced and directed third persons to
enter upon Plaintiffs' land and to construct substantial
portions of Defendants' proposed golf course on Plaintiffs'
land and have cut down trees, removed topsoil, created
road, dug trenches, removed fences, re-contoured land,
installed signs and utilized the property for the storage and
use of construction equipment and materials. Said
Defendants fraudulently induced Plaintiffs to take no immediate
legal action against such intrusions and use of Plaintiffs'
property by continuing to negotiate with Plaintiffs and by
representing that their promises would be performed, but in fact
said Defendants did not intend to perform the oral contract or to
execute and perform the proposed written contract.
* * *

By reason of the foregoing, Defendants... have occupied and
used large portions of Plaintiffs' properties without paying
the agreed consideration, have damaged the property and,
by reason of withholding the promised funds, have denied
Plaintiff the ability to obtain a forbearance of its secured
creditors in order to preclude foreclosure of the deeds of trust
applicable to Plaintiffs' lands.
* * *

By reason of the foregoing Plaintiff was unable to provide
its secured creditors with consideration for the forbearance
of their rights to foreclose and Valley, despite its previous
agreement to forebear if furnished consideration from the
funds to be loaned by Defendant to Plaintiff, has foreclosed
and purchased substantial portions of Plaintiff s property
at foreclosure sales.
(R. 5-8)(emphasis added).

5

8.

Throughout their Brief, Homestead Defendants state that Pride never argued

before the District Court that its original Complaint contained the allegations of promissory
estoppel and implied contract. Homestead Defendants are mistaken because Pride clearly
made this argument before the District Court. (R. 1430-31).
9.

At one point in their Brief Homestead Defendants contend that Pride lost its

property because one of its creditors, Valley Bank, would not agree to forbear from
foreclosure and thus Homestead Defendants' failure to make the $185,000 loan was of no
consequence. Homestead Defendants are mistaken because Valley Bank was willing to
enter into a forbearance agreement but not for $50,000, which was all that Pride was able
to pay for the forbearance agreement without Homestead Defendants' $185,000 loan. (R.
1337, 1412-13, 1498-1500; 920-923).3
TJNDTSPUTED FACTS
There are several undisputed facts material to the issues now before the Court on this
appeal, and they are:
1.

Homestead Defendants have their golf course and Pride has nothing. (R. 1398-

1400; Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1195).

3

This assertion also goes to proximate cause, which is not an issue on appeal.
Proximate cause had no application to the Motion to Amend and with respect to Pride's
Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, causation/damages was not a subject of
that Motion. In other words, Pride sought partial summary judgment on liability, leaving
the issue of damages/causation for trial. (R. 1329). Consequently, whether Valley Bank
would have accepted a sum greater than $50,000 to forbear on its foreclosure rights is
irrelevant to the issues before the Court on this appeal.
6

2.

Homestead Defendants orally agreed to lend Pride the sum of $ 185,000 so that

Pride could make payment to certain of its secured creditors. (R. 1352).
3.

During the course of the Federal Action, Homestead Defendants took the

position that this promise to loan Pride $185,000 related only to the Clark-Pride Property.
{Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1201).
4.

As a result of that promise of a loan, on June 15, 1988, Pride signed the Letter

of Commitment allowing Homestead Defendants to begin construction of their golf course.
{Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1198; R. 846-48, 857, 1398-1403).
5.

Based upon that Letter of Commitment, the City of Midway, Utah granted a

permit and Homestead Defendants began construction of the golf course. {Homestead, 224
F.3datll98;R. 1400).
6.

Construction of Homestead Defendants' golf course resulted in significant

destruction of Pride's property. (R. 858).
7.

Following receipt of that Letter of Commitment, Homestead Defendants

partially performed the loan agreement by issuing a check in the sum of $5,000 to one of
Pride's secured creditors for the purpose of forestalling foreclosure of a portion of the ClarkPride Property, (R. 1353, 1368).
8.

The Federal Bankruptcy Court specifically found that this money represented

part ofthe loan which Homestead Defendants had agreed to make to Pride. (R. 1353,1368).

7

9.

After the golf course was substantially completed, Homestead Defendants

refused to make the balance of the agreed loan unless Pride obtained the subordination of
the loans of its secured creditors. {Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1198; R. 1370,1395).
10.

The issue of subordination was the subject of extensive litigation in the

Federal Action, and the Federal Bankruptcy Court found that Homestead Defendants knew
Pride was dependent upon the loan to obtain forbearance from its creditors and that
Homestead Defendants' failure to fund the agreed loan would result and did result in Pride's
loss of the property. (R. 1370).
11.

The Federal Bankruptcy Court expressly found that Homestead Defendants

had induced Pride to permit construction of the golf course by representing they would loan
Pride $185,000 to enable Pride to avoid foreclosure and that Pride had "reasonably relied"
upon that representation by executing the Letter of Commitment. (R. 13 72)(emphasis added).
12.

The Federal Bankruptcy Court went on to conclude that the loan agreement

between Homestead Defendants and Pride did not require Pride to obtain subordination of
its secured creditors and that the requirement of subordination was not part of the loan
agreement. (R. 1369 and 1373).
13.

The District Court likewise found that "by suggesting that the loan agreement

could go ahead only if Pride obtained subordination agreements of all the lien holders,
including Davis County Bank - a creditor that in no uncertain terms stated it would not
subordinate - HGC [Homestead Defendants] effectively created an impossibility of
performance." (R. 1395)(emphasis added).
8

14.

In reliance upon the promised loan from Homestead Defendants, Pride never

sought an alternative source of funding for forbearance agreements with its creditors. (R.
1400).
15.

The Federal District Court found that there was no express contract between

the parties, which was the basis for affirming the Federal Bankruptcy Court. (R. 1386).
16.

The 10th Circuit affirmed the District Court's finding of no express contract,

but the 10th Circuit recognized that the doctrines of promissary estoppel and partial
performance "might allow a remedy where no formal contract exists." {Homestead, 224
F.3datl202fh. 9).
17.

The 10th Circuit, however, did not apply either doctrine because "Pride... did

not advance arguments based upon these theories until its Reply Brief..."

(Homestead,

224 F. 3d at 1202 fn. 9).
18.

The 10th Circuit expressly stated that its holdings were "limited to the

fourteenth hole property" and that "our decision therefore does not preclude any
pending or future actions involving claims relevant only to the Clark-Pride Property."
(Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1201 fn. 7)(emphasis added).
THE 10tb CIRCUIT'S DECISION THAT ITS HOLDING WOULD
NOT PRECLUDE PRIDE FROM PURSUING PENDING OR
FUTURE CLAIMS RELATED TO THE CLARK-PRIDE PROPERTY
IS ITSELF RES JUDICATA
The 10th Circuit never expressed an opinion that its ruling on the 14th Hole Property
would extend to Pride's claims to the Clark-Pride Property. In fact, the 10th Circuit

9

specifically stated that: "Because the scope of the complaint and subsequent finding of
the bankruptcy court are limited to the fourteenth hole property, we do not address
whether the parties entered into an agreement or contract relative to the Clark-Pride
property. Our decision therefore does not preclude any pending or future actions
involving claims relevant only to the Clark-Pride property." Homestead, 224 F.3d at
1201 fn.7. Pride thus submits that this limitation which the 10th Circuit clearly imposed
upon its own ruling is in fact res judicata on the issue of whether that decision applies to
Pride's implied contract and promissory estoppel claims. Simply put, irrespective of the
supremacy clause, the 10th Circuit stated the scope of its decision in Homestead and that
ruling is binding because "federal law governs the collateral estoppel effect of a case
decided by a federal court." See Clarkv. Columbia/HCA Information Services, Inc.,25 P.3d
215, 224 (Nev. 2001); Fireman's Fund Insurance Company v. Intern. Marketplace, 773
F.2dl068, 1069 (9th Cir. 1985).4

4

Neither res judicata nor the doctrine of collateral estoppel are absolute defenses.
While they are both generally applied as a matter of public policy to prevent the relitigation of claims, neither of these doctrines constitutes an absolute bar in all situations.
They are judicially created. Hence, they are not automatically applied in every situation.
LaSociete Anonyme v. Jean Patou, 495 F.2d 1265, 1276 (2nd Cir. 1974)(since the
doctrine of res judicata is intended to serve the aims of fairness and efficient judicial
administration, it need not and should not be applied mechanically when those goals are
not served). Rather, these doctrines are only applied as public policy dictates. In other
words, both doctrines are weighed against other competing interest and, on occasion,
yield to other public policies. Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F.2d 35, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
10

HOMESTEAD DEFENDANTS CONCEDE THAT THE FEDERAL
BANKRUPTCY COURT NEVER HAD SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION OVER THE CLARK-PRIDE PROPERTY
It is undisputed that the Federal Bankruptcy Court, Federal District Court and 10th
Circuit lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Clark-Pride Property. (R. 1414-18).
Because the Federal Action had no subject matter jurisdiction over the Clark-Pride
Property, decisions made in the Federal Action did not affect the Clark-Pride Property or
Pride's claims related to that property. See e.g. United States v. 51 Pieces of Real Estate
Property Roswell New Mexico, 17F.3d 1306,1309 (10th Cir. 1994)(concluding that orders
and judgments entered with respect to property over which a court has no subject matter
jurisdiction are void and unenforceable). In its Opening Brief Pride argued the effect of this
lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the Federal Action as to the Clark-Pride Property and
how this precluded the 10th Circuit's decision in Homestead from triggering the doctrine of
res judicata. {Pride's Opening Brief pp. 18-19). Homestead Defendants, however, failed
to respond to that argument and for good reason: without subject matter jurisdiction over the
Clark-Pride Property, Pride could not have litigated its claims related to that property in the
Federal Action. Hence, resjudicata or collateral estoppel would not arise as to those claims.
See Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247-50 (Utah 1989).
PRIDE'S THEORIES OF IMPLIED CONTRACT AND PROMISSORY
ESTOPPEL DO NOT REQUIRE REOPENING OF DISCOVERY
Homestead Defendants argue that if Pride is allowed to proceed under equitable
theories of implied contract and/or promissory estoppel it will be severely prejudiced

11

because discovery will have to be reopened on issues such as: whether Pride's reliance upon
the promise of a loan was reasonable? Pride does not agree that discovery needs to be
reopened on that issue because the Federal Bankruptcy Court expressly found that
Homestead Defendants had induced Pride to permit construction of the golf course by
representing they would loan Pride $185,000 to enable Pride to avoid foreclosure and that
Pride had reasonably relied upon that representation by executing the Letter of Commitment.
(R. 1372). It is also undisputed that in reliance upon the promised loan from Homestead
Defendants, Pride never sought an alternative source of funding for the forbearance
agreements with its secured creditors. (R. 1400). But if additional discovery is required on
the question of whether Pride reasonably relied on Homestead Defendants' promise of the
$185,000 loan, it would be discovery of Pride and Pride's officers. In other words, the
reasonableness of Pride's reliance has nothing to do with Homestead Defendants. More
importantly, since no trial date has been set, there is nothing to preclude Homestead
Defendants from undertaking this additional discovery.
HOMESTEAD IS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE DEATH OF
VICE PRESIDENT LEMUEL STROUD
Homestead Defendants argue that because its Vice President, Lemuel Stroud, died
before the Federal Action was concluded, it would be "extremely prejudicial" to allow Pride
to assert u new" theories based upon Stroud's conduct. {Homestead Defendants' Brief, pp.
19-20). This argument ignores the fact that Stroud was repeatedly deposed and also testified
several times in the Federal Action. Additionally, he was examined on the promise of the

12

$185,000 loan which forms the basis of Pride's so-called "new" theories of recovery and the
fact of that promise having been made is undisputed: "Plaintiff [Homestead Defendants]
and Defendant [Pride Stables] orally agreed that Plaintiff would lend Defendant the
sum of $185,000 so that Defendant could make payment to certain of its secured
creditors." (R. 1352)(emphasis added).
THERE IS EVIDENCE OF FRAUDULENT INTENT ON BEHALF
OF HOMESTEAD REGARDING THE SUBORDINATION
Homestead Defendants argue that there is no evidence to support the claim that they
never intended to honor the promise made to Pride regarding the $185,000 loan. But Pride
submits that there is such evidence. In its Memorandum, Opinion and Order affirming the
Federal Bankruptcy Court's decision, the Federal District Court found that Homestead
Defendants knew Pride's creditors would not agree to subordinate. The District Court
likewise found that "by suggesting that the loan agreement could go ahead only if Pride
obtained subordination agreements of all the lien holders, including Davis County
Bank - a creditor that in no uncertain terms stated it would not subordinate - HGC
[Homestead] effectively created an impossibility of performance." (R. 1395).
Based upon its review of the record, the Federal District Court affirmed the Federal
Bankruptcy Court's decision that Homestead Defendants had anticipatorily repudiated their
promise of a $185,000 loan to Pride by including the demand for subordination: "HGC
[Homestead] was requesting (1) a performance it was not entitled to under the
agreement; and (2) a performance HGC knew would be impossible for Pride to

13

accomplish." (R. 1396). Homestead Defendants'fraudulent intent in this matter is shown
by the Letter of Commitment. Homestead Defendants knew prior to obtaining that Letter
ofCommitmentthat Pride's creditors would not subordinate.5 (R. 1337,1412-13). Knowing
this to be so, having the Letter of Commitment in hand and the golf course substantially
completed, Homestead Defendants insisted upon subordination to avoid having to loan the
$185,000 to Pride. Homestead Defendants' fraudulent intent is likewise shown by their
false denial about knowing Pride's creditors would not subordinate prior to obtaining that
Letter of Commitment. See McQueeney, 779 F.2d at 921-22; Shapak, 629 A.2d at 772.
These facts would certainly support a judgment of fraud against Homestead Defendants and
the District Court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Homestead Defendants
on Pride's fraud claims.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the Third District Court's Order granting Homestead
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. This Court should also issue an Order
reversing the Third District Court's denial of Pride's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and directing that partial summary judgment be entered as a matter of law in favor
of Pride on its Causes of Action for breach of implied contract based upon part performance,

5

The Letter of Commitment, which was prepared by Homestead Defendants'
attorney, represented that the agreement between the parties would be reduced to writing
within two weeks. But Homestead Defendants delayed preparing the written agreements
containing the impossible subordination provision until they had virtually completed
their construction activities upon Pride's land.
14

promissory estoppel, and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, leaving
only the issue of damages for trial on these claims. Finally, if claims for implied contract
and promissory estoppel are not included in Pride's original Complaint, this Court should
reverse the Third District Court's Order denying Pride's Motion for Leave to Amend,
DATED this 24th day of March, 2003.
SUITTERAXLAND
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Jesse C. Trentadue
Michael W. Homer
Attorneys for Appellant/Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of March, 2003,1 caused two true and correct
copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant Pride Stables to be served by first-class
United States mail, postage pre-paid, to:
Richard D. Burbidge, Esq.
Steven B. Mitchell, Esq.
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL

215 South State Street, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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